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Abstract
A general method for mining discourse for
occurrences of the rules of inference would
be useful in a variety of natural language
processing applications.
The method
described here has its roots in Rhetorical
Structure Theory (RST). An RST analysis
of a rule of inference can be used as an
exemplar to produce a relational complex
in the form of a nested relational
proposition. This relational complex can
be transformed into a logical expression
using the logic of relational propositions.
The expression can then be generalized as
a logical signature for use in logic-mining
discourse for instances of the rule.
Generalized logical signatures reached in
this manner appear to be grounded in
identifiable logical relationships with their
respective rules of inference. Thus, from a
text, it is possible to identify a rhetorical
structure, and from the structure, a
relational proposition, and from the
relational proposition, a generalized logical
signature, and from the signature, the rule
of inference residing within the text. The
focus in this paper is on modus tollens and
its variants, but the method is extensible to
other rules as well.

1

Introduction

Recognizing occurrences of rules of inference in
discourse is difficult for humans and computers
alike. A method for doing so would be valuable for
natural language processing, discourse analysis,
and studies in logic and argumentation. Potter
(2018) showed that some standard rules, including
modus ponens, disjunctive syllogism, and some
basic logical operations are directly accessible
using Rhetorical Structure Theory (RST). This

arises as a result of direct mappings between RST
relations, corresponding relational propositions,
and the rules of inference. For others there is no
direct correspondence. This is because the rules of
inference rules tend to manifest, not as individual
relations, but as relational complexes, which may
be embedded within deeply nested relational
propositions.
This paper provides a description of a method
for using RST to discover occurrences of modus
tollens in natural discourse. The paper will extend
this method to biconditional elimination,
particularly as it relates to valid forms of denying
the antecedent. Identifying relational complexes
associated with these rules will support the
specification of generalized logical signatures that
can be used in logic-mining texts. While the
method defined here is limited to modus tollens
and its variants, it provides guidance for
investigating other rules of inference, such as
hypothetical syllogism and dilemma, and may lead
to a general methodology for signature-based logic
mining. This also suggests the possibility of
discovering rules of inference present in discourse
but not recognized in the literature of classical
logic.
The approach described here presumes the
availability of RST analyses, created, either
interactively using tools such as O’Donnell’s
(1997) RSTTool or Zeldes’ (2016) rstWeb, or
computationally (e.g., Corston-Oliver, 1998;
Hernault, Prendinger, duVerle, & Ishizuka, 2010;
Pardo, Nunes, & Rino, 2004; Soricut & Marcu,
2003). These RST analyses may be restated as
nested relational propositions, and these
propositions can be used to generate the underlying
logical organization of the text (Potter, 2018).
Discovery of inference rule instantiations within
this logical expression proceeds by aligning logical
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signatures with structural constituents of the
comprehensive expression.
Lest there be any confusion as to the scope of
this study, note that the objective here is not to
develop a system of reasoning based on linguistic
form, as in natural logic (MacCartney & Manning,
2009; Van Benthem, 1986), nor is it concerned with
the logical forms of imperatives, questions, and
statements, nor with the relationship between
grammar and reasoning (Lakoff, 1970). The scope
of this study concerns the discovery of occurrences
of rules of inference as presented in discourse, as
manifested in rhetorical structures, and with
particular focus on modus tollens. Consistent with
the fundamentals of RST, it is a logic of intended
effect.
The remaining sections of this paper are as
follows. First, a brief review of RST is presented
using an analysis of a relevant example. This is
followed by an overview of the logic of relational
propositions, showing how complexes of nested
relational propositions provide the basis for logical
signatures useful in logic mining. Four generalized
signatures for modus tollens are discussed,
consisting of canonical, evidential, biconditional,
and antithetical signatures. This includes a brief
analysis concerning inference rule identification
for incomplete relational complexes. Following
this analysis is an explanation for how the logical
signatures derived from discourse can be used to
validate the rules of inference they serve to
instantiate. The paper concludes with a discussion
of the results and directions for future study.
Relevant literature will be cited in passim.

2

relations, particularly in implicative relations
where the locus of intended effect will usually be
the implicand (Potter, 2018).
Figure 1 shows an example of an RST analysis.
The text is a short passage from J. L. Austin’s
translation of Frege’s Foundations of Arithmetic
(1884/1980, p. 37). The text presents an argument
against the claim that numbers are merely ideas
without objective reality. Frege begins by stating
that he disagrees with a claim made by the
mathematician Oskar Schlömilch, that numbers are
ideas, not things. Frege supports his statement first
by conceding that if numbers were merely ideas,
then mathematics would be part of psychology.
The CONDITION relation is used to indicate the
dependency of the nucleus on the satellite. But this
conditional is rejected using a comparison of
mathematics with astronomy. This analogy is used
as EVIDENCE for rejecting Schlömilch’s position.
That Frege’s argument is an application of modus
tollens
(((p → q)

¬q) → ¬p)

and that the RST structure presented here maps to
the rule of inference may be intuitively apparent.
However, as will be developed in this paper, this
need not, and in most cases cannot, be merely a
matter of intuition.

RST Analysis of a Relevant Example

Rhetorical Structure Theory (RST) is an account
of textual coherence (Mann & Thompson, 1988).
It is used for describing texts in terms of the
relations that hold among the text spans comprising
the text. An RST relation consists of three parts: a
satellite, a nucleus, and a relation. The satellite and
nucleus are text spans, which are either elementary
discourse units or subordinate RST relations. The
distinction between satellite and nucleus arises as a
result of the asymmetry of the relations. Within a
relation, the nucleus is more salient than the
satellite. A key consideration in defining nuclearity
is the concept of locus of intended effect. The
locus of intended effect may be in the nucleus, the
satellite, or shared between the two. Locating the
effect is important for the logical analysis of RST

Figure 1: RST Analysis of Frege’s Argument
Against Psychologism

3

The Logic of Relational Propositions

It has been argued that Rhetorical Structure Theory
is incapable of representing inferential patterns,
because argumentative and rhetorical relations are
said to be orthogonal to one another, and because
RST relations provide little or no indication of
alignment with the rules of inference (Budzynska,
Janier, Reed, & Saint-Dizier, 2016). However, the
structure of an RST analysis reflects the structure
of its argument.
EVIDENCE is evidential,
MOTIVATION is motivational, and ENABLEMENT is
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enabling. This would suggest the logic and
reasoning are not too far below the surface. As
shown by Potter (2018), for any RST relation there
is a corresponding logical form, and these forms
combine to construct logical expressions that map
to RST tree structures and serve as logical
interpretations of the organization of a text. The
approach used for deriving these interpretations is
based on discourse entities known as relational
propositions. Relational propositions are implicit
assertions that arise between clauses within a text
and are essential to the effective functioning of the
text (Mann & Thompson, 1986a, 1986b, 2000).
RST and relational propositions provide parallel
accounts of discourse coherence. While RST
identifies structures of coherence relations among
the spans within a text, relational propositions treat
these relations as implicit relational acts that
account for how the text functions (Mann &
Thompson, 1986b).
A relational proposition consists of a predicate
and a pair of discourse units. The predicate
corresponds to the RST relation, and the units
correspond to the satellite and nucleus. In this
paper relational propositions are specified using a
functional notation.
This permits concise
representation of nested relational propositions.
For example, the relational proposition for the RST
analysis of the Frege argument shown in Figure 1
is as follows:

result of the perceived incompatibility. By preempting the objection, the writer smooths the way
to increasing the reader’s positive regard for the
situation presented in the nucleus. Logically then,
we can say that it is not the case that the satellite
provides grounds for rejecting the nucleus: ¬(s →
¬n). Upon neutralizing this objection, the writer
further invites the reader to infer from this the
claim presented by the nucleus. The reasoning thus
becomes an instance of modus ponens in which the
condition of the major premise is a negated
conditional statement:
(((¬(s → ¬n) → n)

¬(s → ¬n)) → n)

With the EVIDENCE predicate, the satellite
provides evidence in support of the nucleus. For
the relation to achieve its intended effect, the reader
must accept the satellite and recognize its
implicative relationship with the nucleus. If the
antecedent is believable, the consequent will also
be believable. To achieve its effect, EVIDENCE
requires that the antecedent (i.e. the satellite) be
asserted. Hence the logical form of EVIDENCE is
modus ponens:
(((s → n)

s) → n)

The three logical forms (condition, concession,
and evidence), corresponding to the relations used
in the Frege analysis, can be used to construct the
logical expression of the nested relational
proposition, which expands to the following valid
argument:

evidence(concession(condition(2,3),4),1)

where each elementary discourse unit is identified
numerically in order of appearance in the text.
Each relational predicate is associated with a
logical form. In the above relational proposition,
the condition predicate is defined as material
implication, (s → n). The satellite materially
implies the nucleus. Granted, there are persuasive
arguments in favor of treating condition as
biconditional (e.g., Geis & Zwicky, 1971; Horn,
2000; Karttunen, 1971; Moeschler, 2018; van der
Auwera, 1997a, 1997b); however, for the purpose
of logic mining the biconditional interpretation of
condition will frequently be unnecessary, and
preserving the distinction conditional and
biconditional can be a useful.
With the CONCESSION predicate, the writer
acknowledges a perceived incompatibility between
the situations presented in the satellite and nucleus
and uses this acknowledgement to forestall
objections that might otherwise have arisen as a

((((((¬((2 → 3) → ¬4) → 4)
¬((2 → 3) → ¬4))
→ 4) → 1)
(((¬((2 → 3) → ¬4) → 4)
¬((2
→ 3) → ¬4)) → 4)) → 1)

Using this technique, it is possible to generate
logical expressions for any RST analysis. While
the resulting expressions can be complex, they are
constructed from the simple logical forms defined
for each of the relational predicates. As will be
detailed in Section 4, these forms are generalizable
as logical signatures that may be used in mining
texts for occurrences of rules of inference.
Note that discourse units used in relational
propositions need not be truth-functional in the
restrictive sense of the term. Although it is
common practice present logic in terms of truth
values and truth functions, these semantics are
arbitrary, and we could just as well speak of on and
off, + and -, 1 and 0, yes and no, open and closed,
satisfiability and unsatisfiability, or any other
bivalent conceptualization, including belief and
172

disbelief, positive and negative regard, desire and
indifference, interest and disinterest, understanding
and misunderstanding, or ability and inability. To
the extent that the primitives of RST can be
understood in terms of bivalent values, they are
amenable to logical treatment.

4

((((((¬((p → q) → q) → ¬q)
¬((p → q) → q))
→ ¬q) → ¬p)
(((¬((p → q) → q) → ¬q)
¬((p → q) → q)) → ¬q)) → ¬p)

We can use this logical form as a template for
identifying comparable relational propositions
within texts, keeping in mind that any of the
elements of the expression may refer recursively to
lower level complex expressions. To the extent
that the comparisons align, the logical expressions
for each relational proposition will comprise the
sought-after relational complexes, which provide
the basis for the logical signature.

Relational Complexes

As noted earlier, some inference rules manifest as
single relational predicate, but this is not always the
case. Modus tollens requires multiple predicates,
and these predicates may be combined in various
ways. Each of these combinations, for any given
instance, is a relational complex. A relational
complex may then be generalized and normalized
to create a signature, or logical pattern that may
then be used to locate other instances of the rule in
discourse.
The generalization process consists in replacing
the numeric unit identifiers with normalized
alphabetic variables. Normalization consists in
identifying discourse units that are sufficiently
similar semantically to indicate material
equivalence or negation. This paper makes no
attempt to define a technology for measuring
semantic textual similarity. There are already
numerous research efforts in that area. For
example, Finch, Hwang, and Sumita (2005)
repurposed machine translation evaluation
methods to determine sentence-level semantic
equivalence,
Tsatsaronis,
Varlamis,
and
Vazirgiannis (2010) developed a measure of
semantic relatedness which capitalizes on a wordto-word semantic relatedness measure and
extended it to measure the relatedness between
texts, and Sultan, Bethard, and Sumner (2015)
developed supervised and unsupervised systems
for measuring sentence similarity. Addressing
negation detection, Basile, Bos, Evang, and
Venhuizen (2012) used discourse representation
structures for negation detection, and Harabagiu,
Hickl, and Lacatusu (2006) interpreted negation
using a combination of overt and indirectly
licensed negation.
For the present study,
normalizations are hand-crafted. Thus, for the
generalized signature

5

Canonical Modus Tollens

Modus tollens is a valid argument of the form:
(((p → q)

¬q) → ¬p)

The categorical premise (¬q) denies the
consequent of the conditional premise, implying
the negation of the antecedent (¬p). Figure 2
shows an RST analysis of a Wikipedia example of
modus tollens. As shown, the writer concedes that
the conditional relationship between Rex as a

Figure 2: Rhetorical Structure of Modus Tollens

chicken and Rex as a bird holds, but rejects the
proposition that he is a bird. From this, we may
reason, Rex is no chicken. The relational
proposition for this structure is
condition(conjunction(condition(1,2),3),4)

And the relational complex for this proposition
therefore is:
(((1 → 2)

3) → 4)

This may be generalized and normalized to
(((p → q)

¬q) → ¬p)

which is modus tollens. Stated canonically, the
RST relations are subject matter, rather than
presentational, because there is no intent to
influence an inclination in the reader. In practice,
however, modus tollens is commonly used as an

((((((¬((p → q) → ¬r) → r)
¬((p → q) → ¬r))
→ r) → s)
(((¬((p → q) → ¬r) → r)
¬((p →
q) → ¬r)) → r)) → s)

the normalized logical form, with double negations
removed is:
173
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act of persuasion. This leads to the evidential and
antithetical signatures for modus tollens.

6

Biconditional Modus Tollens

The CONDITION relation sometimes represents a
biconditional logical relation. This is apparent in
part from the definition of the relation as specified
by Mann and Thompson (1987), that realization of
the situation presented in the nucleus (the
consequent) depends upon the realization of the
situation presented in the satellite (the antecedent),
and it is also observable in the text they used as
their example of the relation:

Evidential Modus Tollens

When the writer uses modus tollens with the intent
to influence the reader’s beliefs, the EVIDENCE
relation may be employed. This intended effect
adds to the complexity of the logical structure of
the argument. This occurs in Frege’s argument
against the claim that numbers are merely ideas
without objective reality, introduced earlier.
Frege’s argument, shown in Figure 1, relies on
modus tollens for its validity. EVIDENCE is used
to link the argument’s premises to the conclusion.
As specified by the definition of modus tollens, the
argument starts with a conditional premise:

N: Employees are urged to complete new
beneficiary designation forms for retirement or
life insurance benefits
S: whenever there is a change in marital or
family status.

A change in marital or family status is the
condition under which employees are urged to
complete new beneficiary designation forms. The
reader recognizes that the realization of the nucleus

If number were an idea, then arithmetic would
be psychology,

followed by a categorical premise that denies the
consequent of the conditional premise,
But arithmetic is no more psychology than,
say, astronomy is,

and a conclusion that infers the denial of the
antecedent of the conditional premise:
I cannot agree with Schloemilch…when he
calls number the idea of the position of an item
in a series.

Figure 3: Counterfactual Modus Tollens

The relational proposition for the Frege analysis,

depends on the realization of satellite. If there is
no change in status, there is no need to complete
new forms. If the satellite remains unrealized, so
will the nucleus. Thus, the relation is biconditional
(s « n).
Occurrences of the biconditional as modus
tollens may employ the counterfactual in the
antecedent. The counterfactual contains the denial
of the antecedent within the antecedent itself. In
the example shown in Figure 3, Donald Trump
argues that if he wanted to win the war in
Afghanistan, he could do so within a week. The
counterfactuality of the antecedent indicates that he
does not wish to do so, with the implication that we
therefore cannot do so. This interpretation leads to
a relational proposition defined not only on the
basis of the explicit rhetorical structure, but the
implicit relations as well:

evidence(concession(condition(p,q),r),s)

generalizes to the logical expression:
((((((¬((p → q) → q) → ¬q)
¬((p → q) → q))
→ ¬q) → ¬p)
(((¬((p → q) → q) → ¬q)
¬((p → q) → q)) → ¬q)) → ¬p)

Any analysis that matches this generalized
signature will be an instantiation of the modus
tollens rule of inference. That this is so is
supported in part by the signature’s derivation from
an exemplar of modus tollens, and is further
supported, as will be discussed in detail in Section
9, by the realization that the rule of inference is
deducible from the signature. That is to say, for
any such argument, the canonical rule is logically
implicit within the RST analysis, and therefore
within the text.

condition(conjunction(condition(1,2),[3]),[4])

which normalizes to the biconditional modus
tollens: (((p ↔ q)
¬p) → ¬q). When the
174

normalization process indicates denial of the
antecedent, the charitable interpretation will be that
the CONDITION relation is being used as
biconditionally. Not only may the denial of the
antecedent be implicit, the consequent itself may
be implicit. Incomplete conditionals such as

CONDITION is a satellite of the ANTITHESIS rather
than of CONCESSION. The logical form, and hence
the signature, is disjunctive syllogism,
((((p → q)

¬q)

¬(p → q)) → ¬q)

Thus ANTITHESIS, when the satellite is conditional,
is modus tollens. Alternatively, the CAUSE relation
may be used as satellite to the ANTITHESIS relation,
as shown in Figure 5. This text is interesting in

1. If only Miss Hawkins would get a job…

have an implicit implicative potentiality. While
this example leaves much to the reader’s
imagination, with assistance from context provided
by the writer, or from the reader’s world
knowledge (Elder & Savva, 2018), a pragmatic
conjecture such as
2. [then surely her situation would be
improved.]
3. [But, alas, she has not gotten a job.]
4. [And so her situation remains unimproved.]

seems plausible, and results in the relational
complex:
cause(concession(condition(1,[2]),[3]),[4])

Figure 5: The Cause-Antithesis Modus Tollens

As constructed, the inference relies on denying the
antecedent. Hence it is another example of
biconditional modus tollens. However, the logic
differs from the previous example, due to the use
of the cause predicate instead of condition. The
cause predicate has the same logical form as
evidence, and as such is used to link the argument’s
premises to the conclusion. Clearly, however, the
more fragmentary the information, the greater the
risks of conjecture, and the greater risk of false
positives.

8

several respects. From the logical perspective,
there are arguments within arguments such that the
consequences of one become the condition of
another. And counterfactual conditionality is used
to implement a strategy of reductio ad absurdum,
such that the conclusion of the text indicates its
own negation. Logic mining is useful in sorting
this out. The text divides conveniently into two
parts. Units 1-3 implement the causal variety of
antithetical modus tollens:
((((((p → q)
p) → q)
p) → q)) → r)

Antithetical Modus Tollens

r)

¬(((p → q)

That this is an occurrence of antithetical modus
tollens can be realized by evaluating the causal
argument to obtain its result, q, so that the
expression becomes

ANTITHESIS is used as part of a modus tollens
relational complex in a manner rhetorically similar
to CONCESSION. This is perhaps owing to the

(((q

r)

¬q) → r)

which when normalized becomes a signature for
antithetical modus tollens:
(((p

q)

¬p) → q)

As discussed below in Section 9, modus tollens is
provable using disjunctive syllogism.
An
alternative approach would be to realize that if ((p
→ q)
p), as indicated by CAUSE, then the
CONDITION (p → q) holds as well. The same
approach can be used for segments 3-5. The if-then
statement of 3-4 is coded as a RESULT, because it

Figure 4: ANTITHESIS as Modus Tollens

similarity of the two relations (Stede, 2008). In the
example shown in Figure 4, the structure follows
the familiar pattern of modus tollens, but now the
175

is the antecedent of the condition that is salient in
this text. Segment 3, or r, situated conditionally
within the argument, is the negation of “that is not
the case.” The consequent, provided in 4-5,
provides the reductio ad absurdum. That is, if
“that were the case,” untenable results would
follow.

9

for which we also substitute the consequent, ¬q,
resulting in the valid argument
(((¬q → ¬p)

for which the implicant
((¬q → ¬p)

¬q)

is materially equivalent to the implicant of modus
tollens:

The Significance of Signatures

((¬q → ¬p)

The question will arise as to the significance of
logical signatures.
Are they grounded in
identifiable logical relationships with their
respective rules of inference, or is the
correspondence between signatures and rules
simply a happy coincidence? Both signatures and
rules are valid arguments, both share the same
elementary propositions, and both reach the same
conclusion. It would therefore be useful to
determine whether the rules of inference are
deducible from the signatures, and if not, what the
nature of the relationship is. So now we can
examine each the signatures introduced above and
determine their relationship to modus tollens. The
signatures to be considered include canonical,
evidential, biconditional, and antithetical modus
tollens. For canonical modus tollens, the signature
maps directly to the inference rule; it is indeed
simply a statement of the rule, (((p → q) ¬q) →
¬p). Evidential modus tollens is a more interesting
case. It has already been shown that the logical
signature for

¬q) ↔ ((p → q)

¬q)

Thus the evidential interpretation effectively
reduces to modus tollens. This is applicable to the
logical forms of each of the modus ponens
presentational relations, including BACKGROUND,
ENABLEMENT, EVIDENCE, JUSTIFY, MOTIVATION,
and PREPARATION, as well as the causal relations.
The presentational version of biconditional
modus tollens operates similarly. The relational
proposition
evidence(concession(condition(p,q),r),s)

normalizes to
((((((¬((p ↔ q) → p) → ¬p)
¬((p ↔ q) → p))
→ ¬p) → ¬q)
(((¬((p ↔ q) → p) → ¬p)
¬((p ↔ q) → p)) → ¬p)) → ¬q)

The modus ponens
(((¬((p ↔ q) → p) → ¬p)
¬p)

¬((p ↔ q) → p)) →

occurs twice within this expression. Replacing this
with its consequent, ¬p, yields

evidence(concession(condition(p,q),r),s)

(((¬p → ¬q)

is

¬p) → ¬q)

which is modus tollens. This is applicable to
biconditional occurrences of the same RST
relations as evidential modus tollens, except that
the categorical premise normalizes to the negation
of the antecedent of the conditional premise, rather
than the consequent. It is by this means that this
biconditional modus tollens can be distinguished
from evidential modus tollens.
The relational proposition of antithetical modus
tollens is antithesis(condition(p,q),r) for which the
generalized signature is

((((((¬((p → q) → q) → ¬q)
¬((p → q) → q))
→ ¬q) → ¬p)
(((¬((p → q) → q) → ¬q)
¬((p → q) → q)) → ¬q)) → ¬p)

This expression contains two occurrences of the
valid argument
(¬((p → q) → q) → ¬q)

We evaluate and replace those occurrences with
their consequent, ¬q, resulting in
(((((¬q
¬((p → q) → q)) → ¬q) → ¬p)
((¬q
¬((p → q) → q)) → ¬q)) → ¬p)

((((p → q)

¬q)

¬(p → q)) → ¬q)

Since one of the proofs of modus tollens is based
on disjunctive syllogism, it can be shown that
modus tollens follows from the normalized
expression. The major premise of the disjunctive

which contains two occurrences of the valid
argument
((¬q

¬q) → ¬p)

¬((p → q) → q)) → ¬q)
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The generalized signatures would subsume
instances of inference rules in a relational
proposition. Subsumption would succeed when the
proposition contains a logical structure isomorphic
with the signature. The signature would need to
match both simple and composite spans, so that
instantiation could occur at any level within the
structure.
Using RST as the starting point for inference
rule discovery simplifies the task, but also delimits
it. These delimitations arise not so much the result
of well-known concerns about the validity of RST
(e.g., Asher & Lascarides, 2003; Budzynska et al.,
2016; Grosz & Sidner, 1986; Knott, Oberlander,
O'Donnell, & Mellish, 2001; Moore & Pollack,
1992; Sanders, Spooren, & Noordman, 1992;
Webber, Stone, Joshi, & Knott, 2003; Wiebe, 1993;
Wolf & Gibson, 2005), but out of a fundamental
feature of the theory—namely that it is a theory of
coherence relations. Perhaps this delimitation is an
asset. By basing the concept of logic-mining on a
theory of coherence relations, it is by definition
constrained to discursive inferences discoverable
within a text. The granularity of analysis being at
the clausal level, the inferences discoverable
among these clauses are propositional. A benefit
of this is that many problems in natural language
inferencing, such as those described by Lakoff
(1970), van Benthem (2008), MacCartney (2009)
and Karttunen (2015), e.g., determining logical
relationships among arbitrarily selected assertions,
are avoided. They are avoided not because they do
not exist, for indeed they do, but because they need
not come to the surface. A practical solution for
logic-mining texts for rules of inference should be
both useful and interesting, and perhaps the
techniques arising from this work will contribute to
solving grander challenges. For now, the essence
of logic-mining is that from a text, it is possible to
identify a rhetorical structure, and from the
structure, a relational proposition, and from the
relational proposition, a generalized logical
signature, and from the signature, the rule of
inference residing within the text.

syllogism, ((¬p
q)
¬q), implies (p → q), so
that if it is the case that
(((¬p

q)

¬q) → (p → q))

it follows that both the premise and the conclusion
hold,
(((¬p

q)

¬q)

(p → q))

and it is a tautology that
(((¬p
q)
¬q)
((p → q)
¬q)

(p → q)) ↔

Thus, modus tollens may be inferred from the
logical signature for antithesis(condition(p,q),r).
And thus, the evidential, biconditional, and
antithetical signatures can be used, not only to
discover instances of modus tollens in discourse,
they are grounded in the rule of inference they are
designed to detect.

10 Conclusion
This exploration of modus tollens has shown how
relational propositions can be used to support
discourse logic-mining using logical signatures as
a means for discovering occurrences of standard
rules of inference in discourse. In addition to
modus tollens, several other signatures that serve
as indicators of rules of inference have been noted.
EVIDENCE and other pragmatic and causal
relations map directly to modus ponens, and
ANTITHESIS implements disjunctive syllogism.
Further research is needed to determine what
additional signatures can be identified. These
would provide a rich set of resources for logicmining discourse and reduce the need for ad hoc
procedures for inference rule identification and
would eventually support a greater capability for
automated analysis.
Automated identification of inference rules
within discourse would require development and
integration of several capabilities. Although there
has been significant work in automated detection
of RST relations (e.g., Corston-Oliver, 1998;
Hernault et al., 2010; Pardo et al., 2004; Soricut &
Marcu, 2003), such a capability would need to
generate output as nested relational propositions of
complex structures. Prototype software already
exists for generating logical expressions from
nested relational propositions of arbitrary size and
complexity (Potter, 2018). A unification algorithm
could be used for identifying instantiations of
inference rules in nested relational propositions.
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